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BALANCING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
ABORTION PROTESTORS WITH THE RIGHTS OF
THEIR 'VICTIMS'
On one side of the ongoing abortion debate,' some abortion protestors
focus on stopping individual abortions and putting what the abortion
protestors call "abortuaries" 2 out of business.3 These abortion protestors
claim that they are saving lives, while ultimately working to change the law
to end legalized abortion. 4 To achieve both the immediate goal of stopping
individual abortions and the ultimate goal of legal change, some abortion
protestors' tactics have included blockading abortion clinics' and setting up
1. See Isaacson, The Battle over Abortion; Crusades and Contests Between Those Who
Advocate "Choice" and "Life," TWa, April 6, 1981, at 20 (describing efforts of Congress
and state legislatures to resolve issues surrounding abortion debate). Commenting on the battle
over abortion in 1981, Dr. Everett Koop, later United States Surgeon General, stated that
nothing like abortion has separated our society since the days of slavery. Id. at 20. On one
side are the crusaders "for life," who argue on religious and moral grounds that abortion is
the murder of an unborn person (the fetus) and, thus, should be outlawed by constitutional
amendment. Id. On the other side are crusaders "for choice," who contend that abortion is
a right that women must have if they are ever to be free to control their own bodies, indeed
their own lives. Id.
Current media reports on the ongoing abortion debate consistently characterize the debate
as a war, describing it as probably the most combustible and emotional issue of the time. See
Gross, Pregnancy Centers: Anti-Abortion Role Challenged, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1987, at IB,
col. 2 (characterizing abortion debate as combustible).
2. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (quoting Randall Terry, National Director and Founder of Operation Rescue, stating
that purpose of "rescue" demonstration is to prevent anyone from entering "abortuary" while
"rescue" is in progress), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Clinic, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1147.
3. See Sherman, Old Tactics, New Wars; Courts Deal Blockaders Big Setbacks, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 30 (describing tactics of abortion protestors in ongoing abortion war,
including attempts to close down abortion clinics); National Org. for Women v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488 (observing that Operation Rescue members share deep commitment
to goals of stopping practice of abortion and reversing abortion's legalization).
4. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488 (observing
that Operation Rescue members seek to prevent abortions and to influence society to change
abortion laws).
5. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1345-47 (3d
Cir.) (affirming application of civil RICO to abortion protestors who had blockaded abortion
clinic), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry,
732 F. Supp. 388, 393-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing defendants for civil contempt for violation
of injunction against blockading); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
Supp. at 1496-97 (enjoining permanently defendants from trespassing on or blockading area
abortion clinics); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1262-
64 (S.D.N.Y.) (granting permanent injunction to prohibit blockading or trespassing), aff'd as
modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); National Org.
for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300, 304-05 (D.D.C. 1989) (granting preliminary
injunction against blockading or trespassing); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577,
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mock abortion clinics. 6 Abortion protestors contend that they engage in the
new civil disobedience, employing the tactics of the "1960s liberals" in
support of what the abortion protestors claim are traditional American
values .
7
Organized, widespread blockading of clinics began with the founding
of Operation Rescue, formed in 1988 to close down abortion providers. 8
To close down abortion clinics and prevent abortion clinic employees or
pregnant mothers from entering the clinics, Operation Rescue advocated
activities such as trespassing, blocking doors, or "going limp" in response
to police officers' orders.9 As a result of these activities, the anti-abortion
587-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (granting permanent injunction against blockading or trespassing),
aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 730 F. Supp. 656, 659-62 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (citing defendants for civil contempt for violating injunction against blockading),
aff'd, 920 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1990); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1989)
(issuing preliminary injunction against blockading or trespassing); infra notes 212-26 and
accompanying text (discussing actions of abortion protestors in Northeast Women's Center v.
McMonagle, including blockading abortion clinic); 2,000 Anti-Abortion Protestors Arrested,
Activists Disrupt Clinics in 27 Cities, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 30, 1988, at 3 (describing first
"National Day of Rescue" protests in which members of Operation Rescue engaged in
demonstrations and blockades nationwide).
6. See Gross, supra note 1, at BI, col. 2 (describing activities of mock abortion clinic
operating according to Pearson Foundation guidelines); Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc.,
908 F.2d 318, 318-20 (8th Cir.) (describing mock abortion clinic's alleged conspiracy to prevent
abortion and finding such conspiracy actionable under civil rights conspiracy statute), vacated
on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (reinstating district court's decision to dismiss
complaint against mock abortion clinic for failure to state cause of action under civil rights
conspiracy statute); Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (describing
actions of mock abortion clinic employees who attempted to dissuade plaintiff from obtaining
abortion and holding that plaintiff adequately had pleaded prima facie claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. FM Women's Help &
Caring Connection, 444 N.W.2d 683, 683-84 (N.D. 1989) (affirming permanent injunction
against mock abortion clinic to prevent use of deceptive name); Fargo Women's Health Org.,
Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 179 (N.D.) (modifying and affirming preliminary injunction
against mock abortion clinic to prevent use of deceptive name), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108
(1986); Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North Texas, Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533, 536-37
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming injunction against mock abortion clinic for violating state
statute prohibiting deceptive trade practices), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989).
7. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting abortion protestors who claim to engage
in new civil disobedience).
8. See Brozan, Effectiveness of Abortion Protests Is Debated, N.Y. Times, May 8,
1988, §1, at 28, col. 1 (describing Operation Rescue's first organized blockading efforts to
close down abortion clinics in New York City and predicting many more); Henn & Del
Monaco, Civil Rights and RICO: Stopping Operation Rescue, 13 HARv. WomEN's L.J. 251,
253-56 (1990) (describing formation, goals and tactics of Operation Rescue).
9. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488-90
(E.D. Va. 1989) (citing Operation Rescue literature, which defined "rescue" activities, and
enjoining Operation Rescue from blockading and rescue activities at facilities providing legal
abortion services), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS 1147. In deciding whether to permanently enjoin Operation
Rescue, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in National Org.
for Women v. Operation Rescue considered whether blockading activities constituted trespass-
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blockaders have been subject to court-ordered injunctions as well as money
damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act10 and the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).'"
Similarly committed to preventing abortion, the Pearson Foundation
employs an approach that is more subtle than Operation Rescue's. The
ing, public nuisance, or a civil rights conspiracy to interfere with the right to interstate travel.
Id. at 1492-95. Evaluating Operation Rescue members' activities, the court relied upon
Operation Rescue literature that described Operation Rescue as an unincorporated association
whose members oppose abortion and the legalization of abortion and whose principal goalg
are to stop abortion and to end abortion's legalization primarily through what Operation
Rescue calls "rescues." Id. at 1487. The court cited Operation Rescue's literature that defined
a "rescue" as "physically blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between
abortionists and the innocent victims." Id. at 1488 (emphasis in original).
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in National Org. for
Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 300, 303 (1989), relied on the testimony of a police
official who had been in charge of coordinating police response to special demonstrations.
The police official claimed that Operation Rescue had refused to inform the police which
clinics Operation Rescue would target and actively attempted to mislead the police as to the
intended targets. Id. The police official further testified that Operation Rescue blockaders
would lock arms to form a human barrier to the clinic, would breach police barricades, and
usually would not cooperate with the police who would have to carry the blockaders to a
police transport vehicle. Id. The court concluded that such blockading activities would violate
District of Columbia laws proscribing trespassing and public nuisances, and because the First
Amendment would not protect such blockading activities, the court issued a preliminary
injunction against Operation Rescue. Id. at 304-05.
10. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988); see National Org. for Women v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (E.D. Va. 1989) (issuing permanent injunction pursuant to
civil rights conspiracy statute), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom.
Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS 1147; New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry,
704 F. Supp. 1247, 1262-63 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue,
726 F. Supp. 300, 305 (D.D.C. 1989) (issuing preliminary injunction pursuant to civil rights
conspiracy statute); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (issuing
permanent injunction pursuant to civil rights conspiracy statute), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir.
1990); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 432 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (issuing preliminary injunction
pursuant to civil rights conspiracy statute).
11. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988);
see Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-57 (3d Cir.) (affirming
application of civil RICO to action of abortion protestors, allowing damages and attorneys
fees pursuant to RICO claim, and finding that clean hands doctrine would not bar injunctive
relief pursuant to RICO claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), on remand 745 F. Supp.
1082, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (granting injunctive relief pursuant to successful civil RICO claim);
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Roberts, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5837, *23, 34-35 (W.D.
Wash. 1989) (allowing use of RICO primarily based on predicate offenses of arson and aiding
and abetting arson but holding that RICO does not authorize court to grant injunctive relief);
infra notes 208-43 and accompanying text (discussing application of civil RICO to acts of
abortion protestors in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle). But see Town of West
Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 376-78 (D. Conn. 1989) (finding that while
RICO provides private damage remedy, RICO does not authorize court to order private
injunctive relief), vacated on other grounds, 915 F.2d 92, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1990) (dismissing
Town of West Hartford's RICO claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and vacating
district court's issuance of preliminary injunction pursuant to pendent state law claims).
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Pearson Foundation, a St. Louis organization founded in 1969, issued
guidelines to assist local groups in setting up anti-abortion counseling
centers, 2 also referred to as mock abortion clinics. 3 The foundation provides
training sessions, slide shows, pamphlets, discounted video equipment, kits
to perform urine tests, and a manual entitled "How to Start and Operate
Your Own Pro-Life Outreach Crisis Pregnancy Center.' 1 4 The manual urges
local operators to use neutral advertising that will not alert women to the
fact that the centers do not actually provide abortions. 5 The manual
encourages operators to seek listings in the Yellow Pages telephone directory
alongside abortion clinics.' 6 Primarily facing charges of deceptive advertis-
ing,' 7 these mock abortion clinics also have been sued for intentional
12. See Gross, supra note I, at BI, col. 2 (describing Pearson Foundation's efforts to
establish local anti-abortion counseling centers); Lowery, Abortion in America. Focus on the
City; An Alternative That's Not Always Made Clear, Newsday, Apr. 25, 1989, at 37 (reporting
that some anti-abortion counseling centers operate according to Pearson Foundation guidelines);
Texas Says Center Uses Deception to Stop Abortion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, §1, at 32,
col. 1 (stating that many anti-abortion counseling centers operate according to Pearson
Foundation guidelines).
13. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 320 (referring to anti-abortion
counseling center operating according to Pearson Foundation guidelines as mock abortion
clinic), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (reinstating district court's
decision to dismiss complaint against mock abortion clinic for failure to state a claim under
civil rights conspiracy statute).
14. See Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North Texas, Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533,
537 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (describing Pearson Foundation manual entitled, "How to Start and
Operate Your Own Pro-Life Outreach Crisis Pregnancy Center"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2431 (1989); Gross, supra note 1, at BI, col. 2 (describing Pearson Foundation's training
sessions, slide shows, pamphlets, discounted video equipment, and kits to perform urine tests).
15. See Mother & Unborn Baby Care, 749 S.W.2d at 542-43 (stating that Pearson
Foundation's manual urges use of neutral advertising and finding that such advertising amounts
to deceptive advertising). In Mother & Unborn Baby Care the Texas Court of Appeals
considered whether sufficient evidence to supported the lower court's verdict against the mock
abortion clinic for deceptive advertising. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals relied upon evidence
which showed that a large number of women found the mock abortion clinic's advertisement
in the Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages. Id. at 536. Believing the clinic to be an abortion clinic,
women contacted the clinic to request an abortion. Id. The clinic's staff gave evasive answers
to women who called to make an appointment for an abortion, leading the women to believe
that the clinic was an abortion clinic. Id. As a result, many women made appointments with
the clinic to obtain abortions. Id. The court found that the clinic advertised in the Yellow
Pages under the heading "Abortion Information & Services," and "Clinics - Medical," but
that in 1986 the Yellow Pages refused to allow the clinic to further advertise under these
headings. Id. at 537. Instead, the Yellow Pages moved the clinic's advertisement to "Abortion
Alternatives"; nevertheless, the advertisement appeared under two columns of "Abortion
Services," and was twice the size of the previous advertisements. Id. Accordingly, the Texas
Court of Appeals concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support the verdict against the
mock abortion clinic for deceptive advertising. Id. at 543.
16. Id. at 536-37.
17. See Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. FM Women's Help & Caring Connection,
444 N.W.2d 683, 686 (N.D. 1989) (affirming injunction against mock abortion clinic to prevent
use of deceptive name); Mother & Unborn Baby Care of North Texas, Inc. v. State, 749
S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming injunction against mock abortion clinic to
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infliction of emotional distress 8 and for a civil rights conspiracy against
the class of women who have decided to have an abortion. 19
On the other side of the abortion debate, abortion rights advocates,
along with the "victims" of the protestors, counterattack in courthouses,
Congress and state legislatures and at the ballot boxes around the country. 2°
Primarily through the use of RICO21 and the Civil Rights Act conspiracy
provision, z2 abortion rights advocates and the victims of some of the abortion
protestors are fighting legal battles to stop abortion protestors' interference
with a woman's exercise of her constitutional right to have an abortion.?
Other victims of abortion protestors have suffered tortious harm as well as
property damage and are fighting legal battles to gain compensation.2
Courts, in the middle of the abortion war, must resolve the competing
claims of the abortion protestors and their victims, including claims that
the actions of some abortion protestors in blockading clinics or operating
prevent use of deceptive advertising), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 2431 (1989); Fargo Women's
Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176, 183 (N.D.) (affirming injunction against mock
abortion clinic to prevent use of deceptive name), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
18. See Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 207-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
plaintiff had stated claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on mock
abortion clinic's employees' abortion counseling).
19. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 325 (allowing application of
civil rights conspiracy statute to abortion clinic's alleged attempt to deprive plaintiff of
constitutional right to have abortion), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990)
(reinstating district court's decision to dismiss complaint against mock abortion clinic for
failure to state cause of action under civil rights conspiracy statute); infra notes 154-90 and
accompanying text (discussing applicability of civil rights conspiracy statute to mock abortion
clinic in Lewis).
20. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (describing abortion rights advocates' use of two
federal ftatutes in courts across country to obtain injunctions against abortion protestors);
Gest, Baer, & Borger, The Abortion Furor, U.S. NEWS & WoRI REP., July 17, 1989, at 18
(reporting that abortion rights advocates oppose restrictive state legislation, propose statutes
preserving abortion rights, and campaign for initiatives to amend state constitutions or statutes
through direct popular votes); Carlson, The Battle Over Abortion; A Bitterly Divided Supreme
Court Sets the Stage for the Most Corrosive Political Fight Since the Debate Over Viet Nam,
TimE, July 17, 1989, at 62 (describing abortion advocates' intentions to fight battle at ballot
box, converting congressional, state-legislative, gubernatorial, and judicial elections into litmus
test on abortion); L. TRmE, ABORnON: THE CLASH Op ABsOLuTEs 6-7, 147-50, 177-91 (1990)
(arguing that participants in abortion debate have distorted national elections to detriment of
democratic process and American people by encouraging single-issue campaigning).
21. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
22. Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
23. See supra notes 10, 11, and 18 (listing cases in which abortion rights advocates or
victims of abortion protestors have sued abortion protestors under Civil Rights Act, RICO,
or state law claims); Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (describing legal battles between abortion
protestors and abortion rights advocates along with victims of some abortion protestors).
24. See Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 207-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
plaintiff had stated claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on mock
abortion clinic's employees' abortion counseling); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. Mc-
Monagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (awarding damages based on loss to
property and trespass to women's health care center due to actions of abortion protestors),
aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
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mock abortion clinics go well beyond the anti-abortionists' First Amendmentz
right to express opinions.26 According to the abortion rights activists and
thie victims of abortion protestors, when the actions of abortion protestors
exceed First Amendment protected activity, civil RICO or the Civil Rights
Act provides appropriate remedies 7 for the victims of protestors' actions. 
2
Further, some abortion rights activists consider the use of civil RICO or
the Civil Rights Act necessary because state law remedies, such as state
statutory rights, state common law remedies, and criminal statutes, are weak
or ineffective and, consequently, lack the ability to prevent a single group
25. U. S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble."
26. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (describing tactics of abortion protestors and claims
of abortion rights advocates that actions of abortion protestors exceed First Amendment
protection).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (stating RICO's civil remedies). Section 1964(c) allows
any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962 to sue and,
if successful, recover triple damages and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. Id. While § 1964(a) authorizes district courts of the United States to prevent and restrain
violations of § 1962 by issuing appropriate orders, courts have disagreed on whether civil
RICO provides injunctive relief to private plaintiffs. See Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1081-88 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that civil RICO did not provide
private injunctive relief), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987); Town of West Hartford v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 376-78 (D. Conn. 1989) (same), vacated, 915 F.2d 92
(2d Cir. 1990); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same);
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 84-86 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (same). But see, Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1064 (8th Cir. 1982) (suggesting injunctive relief available either under
RICO or general equitable powers), aff'd on reh'g, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonage, 665 F. Supp.
1147, 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (concluding that clean hands defense barred injunctive relief under
successful RICO claim, implicitly recognizing that absent such defense, RICO could provide
private injunctive relief), aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342, 1353-57 (3d Cir.) (holding that
lower court erred in applying unclean hands doctrine and remanding for further consideration
of claim for private injunctive relief under successful RICO claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
261 (1989), on remand, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (granting private injunctive
relief pursuant to successful civil RICO claim); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F.
Supp. 908, 910-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that Congress did not intend civil RICO provisions
to deprive district court of traditional equitable jurisdiction), aff'd on other grounds, 730 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1984).
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) expressly provides that the victim of a civil rights conspiracy, as
defined in this section, may sue for the recovery of damages caused by the injury or deprivation
of rights. Courts have also granted injunctive relief pursuant to this section. See supra note
10 (listing cases in which courts have granted injunctive relief pursuant to § 1985(3)).
28. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (describing abortion rights advocates claim that
RICO provides appropriate remedies); Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F.
Supp. 1300, 1306-10 (allowing application of civil RICO to conduct of abortion protestors
and finding no infringement upon First Amendment rights of abortion protestors), later
proceeding, 665 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); supra note 10 (listing cases in which courts have applied
injunctions, pursuant to Civil Rights Act conspiracy provision, over abortion protestors'
assertions of First Amendment protection).
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of persons acting pursuant to an overall plan from engaging in repeated,
unlawful acts. 29
Abortion protestors, however, claim that the application of federal
statutes such as civil RICO or the Civil Rights Act to forms of anti-abortion
protests impermissibly infringes upon the First Amendment rights of the
abortion protestorsY° Abortion protestors have sought to avoid the appli-
cation of statutes such as RICO, claiming that their political beliefs motivate
their actions and describing their conduct as civil disobedience." Further,
abortion protestors, like other civil disobedients, claim that a defense based
upon justification should absolve the protestors of any criminal or civil
liability for conduct that may exceed First Amendment protection.
32
To resolve these competing claims, the courts must determine what, if
any, significance to give to the status of abortion protestors as civil
disobedients33 and must consider the extent to which the First Amendment
protects the conduct of the abortion protestors.3 4 Some abortion protestors
29. See Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 8, at 267-68, 276-77 (arguing that use of RICO
comports with civil rights tradition of protecting exercise of constitutional rights from physical
interference and that RICO provides effective way to stop multiple criminal acts of Operation
Rescue).
30. See Williamson, Nader Calls DeConcini 'Shameless' on Crime Bill, San Francisco
Chronicle, Nov. 16, 1989, at A18 (detailing criticism of and support for efforts to reform
RICO, including American Civil Liberties Union's criticism of use of RICO against anti-
abortion protestors because of danger to First Amendment rights of protestors); Califa, RICO
Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAaN. L. Rav. 805, 849-50 (1990) (arguing that use of RICO in
ideological disputes is inappropriate and harmful because of chilling effect on First Amendment
rights); Meiley, The Stretching of Civil RICO: Pro-Life Demonstrators Are Racketeers?, 56
UMKC L. REv. 287, 312 (1988) (arguing that Congress must reform RICO to prevent
misapplication and infringement upon First Amendment rights); Note, Limiting Political
Expression By Expanding Racketeering Laws: The Danger of Applying a Commercial Statute
in the Political Realm, 20 RuTrEPos L.J. 201, 225 (1988) [hereinafter, Note, Political Realm]
(claiming that application of RICO in political realm chills First Amendment rights).
31. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir.)
(discussing abortion protestor's description of conduct as civil disobedience and assertion that
civil RICO is, therefore, inapplicable), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
32. See id. at 1350-52 (discussing abortion protestor's assertion of justification defense);
United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 816 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (reaffirming irrelevance of
justification defense based on intent to save lives when defendant broke into military installation
and disabled military equipment); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 856-57 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973) (holding justification defense unavailable to defendant who
falsely claimed excessive exemptions on Internal Revenue Service form to dramatize protest
against Vietnam War); Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64
N.Y.L(. L. Ray. 79, 82-85 (1989) (arguing that justification defense should be available to civil
disobedients as class of criminal defendants who satisfy legal elements of defense).
33. Cf. R. DwoRaiN, TAYxNo RIGHTS SERIousLY 206-22 (1978) (suggesting that courts
and government must give some significance to claim that those who disobeyed draft laws did
so out of conscience).
34. See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348-49 (finding that district court sufficiently considered
extent to which First Amendment protected abortion protestors' conduct, implicitly recognizing
that court must evaluate extent to which First Amendment protects conduct of abortion
protestors); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (E.D.
1991]
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characterize their actions as the new civil disobedience, claiming that if the
abortion protestors disobey any laws, such as civil RICO or the Civil Rights
Act, the protestors do so out of conscience. 3  Although Congress has
statutorily defined racketeering activities 6 and civil rights conspiracies, 37 no
statutory definition exists for civil disobedience. The phefiomenon of civil
disobedience long has been the subject of intellectual interest and discussion,
and examples of civil disobedience are found throughout American history.
3s
Various writers have relied upon the teachings or writings of the most
famous practitioners of civil disobedience, Henry David Thoreau, Mahatma
Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., to define the motives, purposes, and
elements of action that the term civil disobedience encompasses. 39 While no
single definition of civil disobedience commands general agreement,4 the
common features of the various definitions should assist a court in resolving
the competing claims of the civilly disobedient abortion protestors and their
victims.
Va. 1989) (stating that court cannot curtail First Amendment rights of abortion protestors but
that abortion protestors may not use First Amendment as excuse to engage in unlawful conduct,
implicitly recognizing that court must evaluate extent to which First Amendment protects such
conduct), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub. nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Clinic 1991 US LEXIS 1147; New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247,
1262-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that court must accomplish purpose of protecting right to
choose abortion and obtain medical care without intruding upon abortion protestors' First
Amendment rights, implicitly recognizing need to consider extent to which First Amendment
protects conduct of abortion protestors), aff'd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
35. See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1348 (discussing abortion protestors' description of
conduct as civil disobedience); Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting abortion protestors who
characterize own conduct as new civil disobedience).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988) (listing predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity
and defining pattern of racketeering activity as occurrence of at least two predicate acts within
ten years).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) (1988) (defining civil rights conspiracy as any act in further-
ance of conspiracy to deprive any person or class of persons of equal protection of laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under law, thereby injuring person or property or depriving
right or privilege).
38. See D. WEBER, CIVIw DISOBEDIENCE IN AmERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 18 (1978)
(chronicling examples of and attempts to define civil disobedience throughout American
history). Weber summarizes that the history of American civil disobedience falls into three
broad and generally distinct categories. Id. The first civil disobedience category is opposition,
mainly by individual dissenters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to legal violations
of the principle of religious liberty. Id. The second category is disobedience, mainly in the
nineteenth and twentieth century, to statutes that seemed to implicate individual citizens in
immoral actions. Id. The third category is the use of mass civil disobedience as a tactic to
achieve social or legal change, primarily in the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.
Id. Each of these categories has its own characteristic forms and internal logic. Id.
39. See L. BuzzARD & P. CAmPBELL, HOLY DISOBEDIENCE: WHEN CERISTIANS MUST
REsIST TE STATE 41-54 (1984) (relying upon teachings of Thoreau, Gandhi, King and other
writers to offer general definition of civil disobedience based on common motives, purposes,
and elements).
40. See infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text (comparing similarities and differences
between various definitions of civil disobedience).
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One common feature of the various definitions of civil disobedience
focuses on the civil disobedient's motive. 41 The civil disobedient's motive in
breaking the law may be to protest a law the disobedient believes to be
unconstitutional or immoral.4 2 The disobedient's motive also may be to
accomplish some betterment in the society by refusing to participate in the
perpetuation of conditions necessary for the enforcement of some offensive
policy.43 For example, a civil disobedient may break laws that the disobedient
considers just in the abstract but unjust in a particular case, or unjust to
those not in a position to protest for themselves." Related to the motives
of a civil disobedient, the purposes of engaging in civil disobedience vary
widely. 45 A civil disobedient may wish to avoid what the disobedient views
as doing wrong or to call attention to an injustice." A civil disobedient
also may seek to interfere with the operation or implementation of a
proposed law, to awaken the public to an evil, to slow or halt the operation
of law, to disrupt some structured order to force changes in the social
structure, or even to undermine the authority of government officials.
47
41. See infra note 42-44 (discussing how various writers have described civil disobedient's
motive).
42. See L. BUZZARD & P. CAMPBELL, supra note 39, at 42 (discussing motive of civil
disobedient); Keeton, The Morality of Civil Disobedience, 43 TEX. L. REv. 507, 508 (1965)
(defining civil disobedience as act of deliberate and open violation of law with intent to protest
wrong or accomplish betterment in society); King, Love, Law, and Civil Disobedience (1961),
in D. WEBER, supra note 42, at 212, 215-16 (describing civil disobedient as one who disobeys
law based on conscious belief that law is unjust).
43. See L. BUZZARD & P. CAMPBELL, supra note 39, at 42 (discussing motives of civil
disobedient); Keeton, supra note 42, at 508 (defining civil disobedience); Thoreau, Resistance
to Civil Government (1849), in D. WEBER, supra note 42, at 84, 87 (arguing that to protest
slavery, Abolitionists should withdraw personal and property support from government of
Massachusetts, implicitly advocating disobedience to prevent perpetuating conditions necessary
to enforce slavery).
44. See Thoreau, supra note 43, at 87 (arguing against paying tax to Massachusetts
government to protest slavery, implicitly advocating disobedience by taxpayers on behalf of
slaves because slaves were not in position to protest for themselves); L. BUZZARD & P.
CAMPBEL, supra note 39, at 42 (discussing motives of civil disobedient); King, The Trumpet
of Conscience (1968), in D. WEBER, supra note 42, at 222, 224-25 (urging all people to march,
sit-in, and otherwise protest peacefully to gain civil and economic rights for poor and oppressed
who are not in position to protest for themselves).
45. See L. CAMPBELL & P. BUZZARD, supra note 39, at 42 (listing varied purposes of
civil disobedience); P. SINGER, DEMaocRAcY AND DisoBnIMncE 63-104 (1973) (including as
purposes for civil disobedience protection of rights of minority against majority in democracy,
obtaining publicity to encourage change or influence public opinion, pleading for reconsider-
ation of issue by majority or agenda-setting, and conscientious objection); Phelps, No Place
to Go, No Story to Tell: The Missing Narratives of the Sanctuary Movement, 48 WASH. &
La L. Rnv. 123, 126 (1991) (including as purposes for civil disobedience calling attention to
unjust government practice and helping those endangered by government law or practice).
46. See L. Buzzard & P. Campbell, supra note 39, at 42 (listing purposes of civil
disobedience); Phelps, supra note 45, at 123, 126 (stating that one purpose of civil disobedience
is to call attention to unjust law or government practice).
47. See L. BUZZARD & P. CAMPBELL. supra note 39, at 42 (listing purposes of civil
disobedience).
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Elements of law-breaking and conscience are at the core of civil diso-
bedience .4  The actions of the civil disobedient must be based on some
moral belief. 49 According to Henry David Thoreau, in some circumstances
obeying the law is worse than disobeying the law °5 0 and at no time should
one resign one's conscience to a legislator . 5 Furthermore, while civil diso-
bedience may involve breaking a law, civil disobedience is distinct from
revolution or anarchy.5 2 The civil disobedient must realize the legitimacy of
law itself, justifying disobedience by appealing to the incompatibility between
the disobedient's political circumstances and moral convictions.
53
Most contemporary literature on civil disobedience asserts that disobe-
dient action should be nonviolent in nature, although nonviolence is not a
universal criteria.5 4 Both Ghandi and King insisted that civil disobedience
be nonviolent.55 Nonviolence is a central element of civil disobedience
because nonviolence allows the disobedient to act within the prevailing form
of government, whereas violent disobedience threatens governmental struc-
ture and begins to resemble rebellion.5 6 Recent writers, however, reject
48. See id. at 43-44 (stating that elements of law-breaking and conscience are at core of
civil disobedience and discussing those elements as embodied in various definitions of civil
disobedience).
49. See id. at 45-46 (discussing moral belief as element of civil disobedience); Keeton,
supra note 42, at 508-11 (distinguishing evasion of law, riot or rebellion, and inadvertent
violation of law from civil disobedience which is deliberate, open, and conscientious violation
of law based on moral belief); Selfe, Civil Disobedience: A Study in Semantics, 10 LrvmuooL
L. REv. 149, 163-65 (1988) (concluding that while elements of civil disobedience may vary on
case-by-case basis, intent of disobedient to act by or for community is central, implicitly
recognizing that such intent is type of moral belief central to definition of civil disobedience).
50. See Thoreau, supra note 43, at 86 (arguing that to support government would be to
support institution of slavery and, therefore, that to obey law would be worse than to disobey
law).
51. See Thoreau, Civil Disobedience (1948), in ON CIvI. DISOBEDIENCE 11-12 (R. Goldwin
ed. 1969) (characterizing government not as separate entity but as comprised of individuals
responsible first to own consciences, and concluding that at no time should one resign one's
conscience to legislators); L. BuzzARD & P. CAMPBELL, supra note 39, at 205-35 (describing
when one should disobey law to obey one's sense of morality).
52. See Keeton, supra note 42, at 508-10 (arguing that civil disobedience is not aimed
toward overthrow of law and order, but works within framework of legal system to rectify
specific wrongs); R. DwopaxN, supra note 33, at 206-22 (arguing in context of draft evaders
that organized government can and should tolerate some civil disobedience, implicitly recog-
nizing that civil disobedience is not revolution or anarchy).
53. See L. BuzzA"D & P. CAMPBELL, supra note 39, at 46 (discussing elements of civil
disobedience, including realization of legitimacy of law itself).
54. See id. at 48-50 (discussing nonviolence as general element of civil disobedience while
recognizing that some commentators include violent means within definition of civil disobe-
dience); Selfe, supra note 49 at 154-59 (examining several interpretations placed upon word
"civil," including ones exclusive and inclusive of violence, to understand concept of civil
disobedience and aims of practitioners of civil disobedience).
55. See Selfe, supra note 49,. at 157 (stating that both King and Gandhi insisted that
civil disobedience be nonviolent); King, supra note 42, at 212-13 (arguing against violence
because end must be as pure as means).
56. See L. BuzzARD & P. CAPBELL, supra note 39, at 49 (discussing nonviolence as
central element of civil disobedience because nonviolence is consistent with prevailing form of
government while violence resembles rebellion).
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categorical elimination of violence from the concept of civil disobedience
as a misconception that violence must always be an expression of evil, and
nonviolence of good will.57 David Selfe, a lecturer at Liverpool Polytechnic,
attributes the association between civil disobedience and nonviolence to
pacifists who have used and developed the theory of civil disobedience.
58
Selfe, however, points out that Thoreau was not an avowed pacifist and
may have supported violence in some circumstances.59 Thoreau stated on
one occasion that "the question is not about the weapon, but the spirit in
which you use it" 60 and on another that "the degree of violence which one
may be compelled to show in one's resistance, undergoes conspicuous change
with the times and circumstances."
'6'
Calling themselves civil disobedients, some abortion protestors' claims
coincide with the motives, purposes, and elements set out as common
features in various definitions of civil disobedience. 62 Abortion protestors
claim to break the law, as did Martin Luther King, Jr. and his followers,
to prevent a greater injustice. 6 Unlike the discrimination that King and his
followers sought to eliminate, abortion protestors claim that the injustice
which they seek to prevent is murder." More specifically, abortion protestors
state that the protestors' purposes are to "end legalized child killing," 65 to
protect unborn human life legally," and to eliminate a "serious moral
evil." 67 United States Representative Christopher Smith (R-N.J.) proclaims:
"Our ultimate goal is simply to stop the killing, to provide positive alter-
natives to abortion and to make this country abortion free." 6 Missouri
57. See id. at 50 (stating that recent writers recognize use of violence in civil disobedience
in some situations); Keeton, supra note 42, at 516-17 (promoting nonviolence as responsible
civil disobedience without excluding possibility of violence in circumstances compatible with
objective of long-run betterment of society); K. GREENAWALT, CoaNIrcTs oF LAW AND Mo-
RA=frY 244-65 (1987) (stating that civil disobedient's violent, illegal acts may be warranted to
alleviate more social harm than harm caused by violence).
58. See Selfe, supra note 49, at 157 (discussing element of violence in context of definition
of civil disobedience).
59. See id. at 160 (discussing Thoreau's view of necessity of violence).
60. See id. (quoting Thoreau on necessity of violence).
61. See id. (quoting Thoreau in discussion of element of violence in definition of civil
disobedience).
62. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text (discussing motives, purposes, and
elements of general definition of civil disobedience).
63. See Sherman, supra note 3, at 30 (describing claims of abortion protestors to break
law to prevent greater injustice).
64. See id. (quoting abortion protestors who claim to break law to prevent murder).
65. See Ruling Moves Battle to New Arena, Foes Agree, L.A. Times, July 3, 1989, at
Al, col. 3 (reporting that anti-abortion forces praised Supreme Court decision to restrict
abortions as beginning to end of legalized child killing).
66. See Neuhaus, After Roe; Abortion Rights, NAT'L REv., Apr. 7, 1989, at 48 (discussing
abortion protestors' position that law must protect without exception unborn human life).
67. See Campus Life: Fordham; Should a Group That Would Bite the Hand Be Fed?,
N.Y. Times, May 13, 1990, §1, at 31, col. 6 (quoting Catholic teaching and viewpoint of
many abortion protestors that abortion is serious moral evil).
68. See Ruling Moves Battle to New Arena, Foes Agree, L.A. Times, July 3, 1989, at
1991]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 48:347
State Representative Ted House summarized the purpose of abortion protes-
tors: "Let me make it very clear that while the methodology of those within
the pro-life movement may differ, the ultimate goal of saving as many lives
as possible is exactly the same. ' '69
The common features among the various definitions of civil disobedience
suggest several alternative ways to resolve the competing interests of the
civilly disobedient abortion protestors and their victims. 70 At one extreme,
a court could reject any consideration of the civil disobedient's motive7 as
a defense or as a mitigating factor when resolving the competing claims of
the disobedient and either a victim in the civil context or the government
in the criminal context2 2 Selfe calls this a "legalistic approach." 73 Propo-
nents of a legalistic approach recognize that disobedience to the law may
be justified morally, but insist that disobedience cannot be justified legally
and that, above all, the law must be enforced.74 Proponents of a legalistic
approach, further, would rename civil disobedience as "criminal" disobe-
dience, arguing that civil disobedience actually causes the breakdown of law
and order7 because civil disobedience fosters more general lawlessness. 76
Apparently engaging in a legalistic approach, one court rejected a
defense based on the motive of the abortion protestors as "invalid", calling
the defense 'a feeble effort to emasculate basic principles of civil disobe-
dience."'17 7 Professor Ronald Dworkin criticized the legalistic approach,
arguing that society will not collapse in the face of disobedience but can
endure some disobedience. 78 Dworkin also asserted that because the law
Al, coL 3. (quoting United States Representative Christopher Smith (R-N.J.) on anti-abor-
tionists' commitment to prohibit abortion).
69. See Wolf, Tough Abortion Bill Introduced, UPI, Jan. 16, 1990 (quoting Missouri
State Representative House regarding introduction of bill to ban abortions for social conven-
ience, arguing that bill would save lives).
70. See supra notes 41-61 and accompanying text (discussing common features of various
definitions of civil disobedience); infra notes 71-103 and accompanying text (discussing alter-
native ways court consider claims of civil disobedient).
71. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing motive of civil disobedient).
72. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text (discussing competing claims of abortion
protestors and the abortion rights activists along with victims of abortion protestors).
73. See Selfe, supra note 49, at 152 (describing legalistic approach to defining elements
of civil disobedience as rejecting consideration of civil disobedient's motive).
74. See R. DwoaxiN, supra note 33, at 206 (explaining position of proponents of
legalistic application of laws to civil disobedients).
75. See Selfe, supra note 49, at 152-53 (describing views of proponents of legalistic
approach that civil disobedience causes breakdown of law and order).
76. See Keeton, supra note 42, at 509-10 (criticizing proponents' of legalistice approach
claim that civil disobedience fosters lawlessness and undermines law and order).
77. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1351 (3d Cir.)
(quoting United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 856-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
970 (1973)) (rejecting justification defense of abortion protestors, holding that abortion
protestors' motives could not constitute legal defense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
78. See R. DwoRxm, supra note 33, at 206-07 (arguing that prosecutors should not
completely exclude considerations of intent of civil disobedient and that society can tolerate
some civil disobedience).
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typically distinguishes between lawbreakers based on motive, laws should
be changed or sentencing procedures adjusted to account for the motive of
the civil disobedient.
7 9
At the other extreme, a court could allow a justification defense 0 based
on the disobedient abortion protestor's motive."1 Hugo Bedau contends that
the actions of the civil disobedient are distinct from those of the criminal
precisely because of the intent or motive of each.12 According to Bedau,
the true civil disobedient very rarely, if ever, acts selfishly and without
regard for the principles of law and order, whereas such behavior is typical
of the criminal mind. 3 Furthermore, Bedau argues that criminals very rarely
act justifiably, and even more rarely do criminals act out of conscience. 4
Similarly, J.L. Adams asserts that real crimes are not acts of conscience,
whereas the civil disobedient often appeals to a "higher law," a theological
sanction, or a broader, humanistic sense of religion. 5 Furthermore, the civil
disobedient, unlike the criminal, engages in conduct to bring about change
in the law and to correct injustices. 6 Because of the distinctions between
79. See id. at 206, 222 (concluding that society should not prosecute civilly disobedient
or that society should change laws or adjust sentencing procedures to account for civil
disobedient's intent).
80. See United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1972) (explaining
justification defense). The Simpson court defined the justification doctrine as an acknowl-
edgement that otherwise criminal conduct may be justifiable, and thereby legally excused,
when exigent circumstances have induced a defendant to act as he did. Id. at 517. Under the
justification doctrine, courts may hold as noncriminal, actions taken in self-defense, in defense
of property or other persons, or to avert a public disaster or a crime, according to the Simpson
court. Id. In Simpson the defendant was convicted of destroying government property,
mutilating and destroying records deposited in a government office, and of interfering with
the administration of the Selective Service System. Id. at 516-17. The conviction resulted from
an incident in which the defendant burned some records of the local draft board in an effort
to move the United States towards terminating the conflict in Southeast Asia. Id. Defendant
asserted that his actions were justifiably done to avert criminal acts and to defend property
and persons in the war zone. Id. at 517. While recognizing that society benefits when one acts
to prevent another from intentionally or negligently causing injury to people or property, the
Simpson court found that the justification doctrine did not apply to defendant's situation. Id.
at 517-18. The Simpson court found that defendant's acts were not reasonable and that no
direct causal relationship existed between defendant's action and the avoidance of the harm,
an essential element of the justification defense. Id. at 518.
81. See Apel, Operation Rescue and the Necessity Defense: Beginning a Feminist Decon-
struction, 48 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 41, 42 (1991) (explaining that utilitarian rationale for
allowing justification defense is that society should grant some discretion to individual to
permit individual to act in manner that will promote greater social good and that morality
may demand person to behave contrary to law).
82. See H. BEDAU, CIVIn DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRAcncE 18 (1969) (defining civil
disobedience and distinguishing civil disobedience from criminal violations of law based on
intent of civil disobedient).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Adams, Civil Disobedience: Its Occasions and Limits, in PoiMcAL AND LOAL
OBUATONs 302 (Pennock & Chapman eds. 1970) (defining civil disobedience).
86. Id.
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the criminal and the civil disobedient's intent,8 7 civil disobedients have
asserted defenses based upon justification.8 1 Courts and some commentators,
however, have not been receptive to the civil disobedients' use of a justi-
fication defense and, therefore, either categorically have excluded the avail-
ability of the defense for political protestors or have found that a defendant
failed to present evidence on each of the specific elements of the defense. 9
Instead of completely excluding considerations of motive at one extreme9°
or allowing a justification or necessity defense based upon the motive of
the civil disobedient at the other extreme, 91 a court could limit its consid-
erations of motive as a mitigating factor. Harrop Freeman suggests that
civil disobedience is a recognized procedure for challenging law or policy
and obtaining court determination of the validity of a law or policyY2
Moreover, Freeman suggests that theories of jurisprudence recognize the
propriety of nonviolent challenge to law or policy.93 Freeman argues that
even if the act of protest or disobedience is a technical violation of law,
the motive or purpose of the disobedient should cause the punishment to
be nominal and certainly not more severe. 94 Following Freeman's reasoning,
87. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing difference between criminal's
intent and civil disobedient's intent).
88. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350-52 (3d
Cir.) (rejecting justification defense for abortion protestors), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261
(1989); United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 816 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding irrelevant
justification defense based on intent to save lives when defendant broke into military installation
and disabled military equipment); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 855-56, 859-60
(3d Cir.) (holding justification defense unavailable to defendant who falsely claimed excessive
exemptions on Internal Revenue Service form to dramatize protest against Vietnam War), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1972)
(explaining justification defense and finding that defendant failed to meet elements of justifi-
cation defense).
89. See supra note 88 (listing cases in which courts rejected use of justification defense);
Apel, supra note 81, at 42-43 (arguing that justification or necessity defense should not be
available to Operation Rescue regardless of whether defense is generally available to political
protestors).
90. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of consideration
of civil disobedient's motive).
91. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing justification defense).
92. See Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L.J. 228, 231-
32, 235-37 (1965) (defining civil disobedience and discussing role of civil disobedience in
challenging law). Freeman defines civil disobedience as follows:
(1) "Civil" . . . as "against the state, the civil, the civitas[;]" (2) ... [as] an
"intentional" act, a chosen course, not occasioned by accident[;] (3) ... [as] used
for an external purpose (to call attention to injustice, to change conditions)[;] (4)
... [as] non-violent, at least in origin[;] (5) ... [as] a form of communication ...
within the theory of the First Amendment[;] (6) ... [as] used by those who are in
fact barred from otherwise exerting power[;] (7) ... [as] either legal or illegal.
Id. at 231-32 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 235, 237-39.
94. Id. at 235, 246-47; see also R. DwoaRxs, supra note 33, at 222 (urging accommodation
of sentencing procedures to account for motive of civil disobedient).
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a court may account for the motive of a civil disobedient in sentencing by
offering probation or a suspended or light sentence. 95
Selfe's definition of civil disobedience suggests an alternative to using
motive as a defense 96 or mitigating factor 97 when resolving the competing
claims of the civil disobedient and either the victim in the civil context or
the government in the criminal context.98 As Selfe defines civil disobedience,
the means a civil disobedient employs may vary from noncriminal, tradi-
tional First Amendment protected activity to more violent means such as
bombing or arson.9 In either case, the disobedient's motive remains the
same. 10 Selfe's distinction between the disobedient's means and the diso-
bedient's motive or purpose (a "means-end" distinction) does not preclude
the condemnation of the illegal means.101 This distinction shifts the court's
focus from the motive of the disobedient to whether the meansic 2 used by
the disobedient were legal or illegal-a distinction that is likely to turn upon
whether the First Amendment protects the particular means used by the
disobedient or not. 0 3
Because neither the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade'04 or
95. But see Cox, Abortion Protest: California Judges Are Targeted, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
24, 1990, at 3, 39 (describing Operation Rescue's claims of judicial abuses in handing down
higher sentences to abortion protestors than to other political protestors while judges claim
that abortion protestors reject light sentences such as parol or probation).
96. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing alternative of using civil
disobedient's motive as a defense).
97. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing use of civil disobedient's
motive as mitigating factor in sentencing).
98. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (discussing court's task of resolving
competing claims of abortion protestors and abortion rights advocates along with victims of
abortion protestors).
99. See Selfe, supra note 49, at 159-65 (proposing definition of civil disobedience to
reflect intent of civil disobedient to act for benefit of community and to include spectrum of
means from nonviolent to violent acts); supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing
proposition that violence may be included in definition of civil disobedience).
100. See Selfe, supra note 49, at 163-65 (arguing that intent of civil disobedient is same
regardless of means civil disobedient uses).
101. See id. at 164-65 (asserting that condemnation of civil disobedient's means should
not exclude such means from definition of civil disobedience).
102. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text (discussing elements of civil disobe-
dience that refer to civil disobedient's "means").
103. See infra notes 112-48 and accompanying text (distinguishing First Amendment
protected conduct and unprotected conduct).
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court considered whether the
concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which protects the
right to privacy, protected a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 152-53. The
plaintiff in Roe v. Wade challenged a state statute that made it a crime to procure an abortion
or to attempt one, except for the purpose of saving the mother's life, as unconstitutionally
vague and in violation of her tight of personal privacy that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments protect. Id. at 117-18, 120. While recognizing that a state has a
legitimate interest in insuring that abortions are performed using safe procedures and in
protecting prenatal life, the Supreme Court reasoned that such state interests did not overcome
a woman's right to privacy prior to the viability of the fetus. Id. at 150, 160, 163. After
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Webster v. Reproductive Health Services'05 nor federal or state legislation
has settled the abortion issue legally or popularly, 1°6 abortion protestors,
through various means, including the exercise of First Amendment protected
activities, continue to contribute to the "uninhibited, robust, and wide open
debate"'17 on the legal, political, and social issues surrounding abortion in
the United States. However, the conduct of some abortion protestors at
times may be too uninhibited and robust, going beyond First Amendment
protected activities and creating "victims" by infringing upon a woman's
constitutional right' 08 to have an abortion, 0 9 by inflicting tortious
finding that the right to privacy included a woman's qualified right to choose an abortion,
the Supreme Court formulated what have become known as the Roe trimester rules. Id. at
164-66. During the first trimester, the Court ruled that the abortion decision was to be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. Id. at 164. The Court
allowed reasonable regulations related to maternal health during the second trimester. Id.
Further, the Court concluded that, during the stage of pregnancy subsequent to viability,
which the Court assumed to be the third trimester, a state could regulate or proscribe abortion
to promote its interest in potential life, except where it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother. Id. at 164-66.
105. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutional validity of a state regulation of abortion, which included
provisions prohibiting the use of public facilities and employees to perform abortions not
necessary to save the mother's life, and a preamble which stated that life begins at conception.
Id. at 3046-49. Public health care professionals claimed that the state statute violated the
Constitution and the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision. Id. at 3047-48. The Webster
court declined to pass on the constitutionality of the statute's preamble because the case
presented no concrete facts to which the Court could apply the statute. Id. at 3049-51.
Reasoning that the state placed no governmental obstacle in the way of a woman who chose
to terminate her pregnancy, the Court ruled that the provisions prohibiting the use of public
facilities and employees to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother's life
did not contravene the Supreme Court's abortion decisions. Id. at 3050-53. Instead, under the
state statute, a pregnant woman retained the same options as if the state had chosen not to
operate any public hospitals at all, according to the Webster court. Id. While the Webster
decision could be harmonized with the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, which was based
upon the concept of viability as was the statute at issue in Webster, some members of the
Court, in dictum, questioned the trimester and viability framework of Roe. Id. at 3056-57.
Dissenters argued that the majority was implicitly inviting stricter state regulation of abortion
that would lead to the eventual overruling of Roe. Id. at 3067.
106. See supra notes 104 & 105 (discussing Roe v. Wade and Webster); supra notes 1-24
and accompanying text (discussing ongoing abortion war); National Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (E.D. Va. 1989) (asserting that Webster suggests
that law concerning putative abortion right is in state of flux), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.
1990).
107. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that First
Amendment insures "uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate").
108. See supra notes 104 & 105 (discussing woman's privacy right to choose abortion as
set out in Roe v. Wade despite doubt cast upon decision by Webster).
109. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 318-20 (alleging civil rights
conspiracy against mock abortion clinic for attempt to deny plaintiff's constitutional right to
have abortion), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (reinstating district
court's decision to dismiss complaint for failure to state cause of action under civil rights
conspiracy statute); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493-
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injury, °10 or by infringing upon the property rights of others."'
The Supreme Court has distinguished First Amendment rights as pre-
ferred freedoms'12 and has noted that the loss of First Amendment freedoms,
even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury." 3 First Amendment rights retain a primacy in American jurisprudence
because those rights allow for informed public discourse, the foundation of
a democracy1 4 that is committed to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open.115 Justice Brandeis
asserted that "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.
1 1 6
The Supreme Court has construed the protection of the First Amend-
ment as a guaranty of the right of every citizen to reach the' minds of
willing listeners,"17 assuring the unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing
94 (E.D. Va. 1989) (denying relief under civil rights conspiracy statute for infringement on
right to obtain abortion), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub noma. Bray v.
Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS 1147.
110. See Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 207-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
plaintiff had stated claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on mock
abortion clinic employees' abortion counseling).
111. See Northeast Women's Center v. McMonage, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50 (3d Cir.)
(ailowing use of civil RICO as cause of action for claim based on trespass and damage to
property), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
112. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (invalidating municipal
ordinance that, as construed and applied, unconstitutionally required Jehovah's' Witnesses to
pay license tax as condition to sale of religious literature and violated preferred freedoms of
First Amendment); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (invalidating Texas statute
that required labor organizers to register with state official before soliciting memberships in
labor unions because statute, as applied, violated preferred freedoms of First Amendment).
113. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (finding irreparable injury for
violation of First Amendment rights of Republican employees of sheriffs office who were
threatened with discharge because they were not affiliated with Democratic Party).
114. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (holding unconstitutional statute
that criminalizes publishing editorial on election day because such statute violates First
Amendment, which protects public discourse as foundation of democracy); Mississippi Women's
Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 1989) (denying preliminary injunction
against abortion protestors and holding that First Amendment rights of protestors outweighed
privacy rights of women seeking abortion).
115. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (reversing state
court's rule of law in libel action as deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom
of speech and press necessary to insure uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate).
116. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
117. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
655 (1981) (recognizing First Amendment right to reach minds of willing listeners, but holding
that state rule which confined distribution, sales, and solicitation activities at state fair to fixed
location was permissible restriction on place and manner of communication).
In addition to protecting the right to reach the minds of willing listeners, the Supreme
Court has stated that an unwilling listener may be required to tolerate offensive expression in
public. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971). In Cohen the Supreme Court
considered whether a state statute that prohibited maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace
or quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct violated the First Amendment
as applied to d defendant who was convicted for wearing a jacket, which bore the words
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about political and social changes.1 8 To give vitality to First Amendment
freedoms, courts have applied a narrowed presumption of constitutionality
to statutes that infringe upon free speech, have strictly construed statutes to
avoid limiting fundamental freedoms, have restricted prior restraint and
subsequent punishment, have limited speech only when it presents a "clear
and present danger," have relaxed general requirements of standing to sue,
and generally have set higher standards of procedural due process.11 9 The
policy behind the First Amendment guarantees may coincide with the civil
disobedient's motives, or purposes, or with the elements of civil disobedi-
ence. 12
While the Supreme Court has stated that the government may not
restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or
content,1 21 the Court, nevertheless, has upheld laws imposing content
based restrictions on speech.1 22 The Court has upheld content based
restriction on speech by excluding certain categories of speech from
First Amendment protection, such as obscenity, 23  fighting
"Fuck the Draft," in the corridor of a courthouse. Id. at 15-16. The defendant in Cohen
testified that he wore the jacket knowing that words were on the jacket as a means of
informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft. Id.
at 16. The trial court found that defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor
did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit, or threaten to commit any act of
violence. Id. at 16-17. The Supreme Court observed that the speech involved did not constitute
obscenity or fighting words but that defendant's conviction rested upon defendant's exercise
of freedom of speech. Id. at 20. Further, the Supreme Court stated that the mere presumed
presence of unwilling listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all
speech capable of giving offense. Id at 21. According to the Court, the ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing
it is dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated that state law cannot
excise as offensive conduct one particular scurrilous epithet from public discourse and reversed
defendant's conviction. Id. at 22-23.
118. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (10964) (stating that First
Amendment protected right to unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political and
social change); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (same).
119. See Note, Political Realm, supra note 30, at 220 (discussing methods courts have
applied to protect First Amendment rights and arguing that such methods should be used to
prevent application of civil RICO to political protestors).
120. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (discussing civil disobedient's motives);
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing civil disobedient's purpose); supra notes
48-61 and accompanying text (discussing elements of civil disobedience).
121. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that First
Amendment forbids government from restricting expression because of message, ideas, or
subject matter or content).
122. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (upholding state statute
that prohibited public utterance based on offensive, derisive, or annoying content of utterance).
123. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (defining obscenity as materials
which, taken as whole, appeal to prurient interest in sex, portray sexual conduct in patently
offensive way, and do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and
excluding obscenity from First Amendment protection); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
481-85 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected speech within First Amendment because
obscenity is utterly without redeeming social importance).
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words, 124 and false speech. 25 The Court also has employed a balancing
test in the form of strict scrutiny to determine if the law under review
is narrowly tailored to meet some overriding or compelling governmental
interest,' 26 embodied, for example, in the doctrines of overbreadth' 27 or clear
and present danger.'2 A law not facially violative of the First Amendment
may still unconstitutionally infringe upon one's First Amendment rights as
applied in a particular case. 29 To determine the constitutionality of a law
as applied, the Supreme Court has balanced the state's interests in protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens with the First Amendment
rights of the speaker to determine if the regulation is reasonable. 30 Applying
this balancing test, the Court traditionally upholds content neutral regula-
tions of time, place, and manner of public protest if designed to promote
valid governmental interests.'
Another factor in a court's balancing of competing interests is the
doctrine of chilling effect on First Amendment rights. The chilling effect
doctrine is premised upon the recognition that the legal process is surrounded
by uncertainty and that because of this uncertainty, errors may result, such
as the wrongful conviction of the innocent or the wrongful acquittal of the
guilty.3 2 Further, the potential for error necessitates a determination of
which type of error is more harmful.' In the context of First Amendment
124. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (upholding conviction of defendant under statute
that prohibited words having direct tendency to cause person addressed to act violently).
125. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771-73 (1976) (finding that First Amendment protected truthful commercial
speech but has never protected untruthful speech).
126. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978) (finding
state law that prohibited publication of information about judicial misconduct proceedings
unconstitutional because state's interest in protecting reputation of judges, or in maintaining
institutional integrity of courts, was insufficient to overcome burden on First Amendment
rights).
127. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70-71 (1981) (invoking
overbreadth doctrine to invalidate criminal penalties for violation of ordinance that prohibited
all live entertainment because overbroad laws unconstitutionally deter protected activities).
128. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (striking down state statute that
forbade advocacy of force or violation of law, except where such advocacy is directed to incite
or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action).
129. See TerminielIo v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing conviction of speaker in
large auditorium for violating breach of peace ordinance because, as applied, ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed upon First Amendment rights).
130. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (upholding local ordinance
that prohibited n6 ise or diversion on public or private grounds adjacent to school building as
valid time, place, or manner restriction because ordinance was content neutral and necessary
to further significant governmental interest in education).
131. See id. (same).
132. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect,"
58 B.U.L. REv. 685, 687-88 (1978) (stating that doctrine of chilling effect recognizes uncertainty
and potential for error within legal system and allocates that risk and uncertainty away from
potential infringement upon exercise of First Amendment rights).
133. See id. at 688 (same).
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analysis, the doctrine of chilling effect mandates the formulation of legal
rules that reflect a preference for errors made in favor of free speech.
34
The degree of chilling depends upon the probability of an erroneous verdict
and the magnitude of harm such a verdict might produce. 35 The magnitude
of harm relates closely to the harshness of the penalty, stigma or injury to
reputation, and litigation costs. 36 The chilling effect doctrine reflects the
view that the harm caused by the chilling of free speech is comparatively
greater than the harm that results from the chilling of other activities
involved.137 Accordingly, the chilling effect doctrine mandates that courts
formulate legal rules to allocate the risk of error away from the preferred
value of free speech to minimize the occurrence of the most harmful errors.
13
Specifically in regard to abortion protestors, courts have found that
attempts to persuade another to action clearly are within the scope of the
First Amendment. 39 Similarly, the First Amendment protects the right of
any political protestor to engage in peaceful picketing, leafletting, and
demonstrating. 40 The First Amendment will protect expression designed to
have an offensive or coercive effect as long as the manner of expression
remains peaceful.' 4' Courts have not questioned the rights of abortion
134. See id. (same).
135. See id. at 695 (explaining that chilling effect doctrine looks to probability of erroneous
verdict and magnitude of harm).
136. See id. at 697 (stating that magnitude of harm relates to harshness of penalty, stigma
or injury to reputation, and litigation costs); Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint
Doctrine, 67 CoRNu. L. Rav. 245, 266 (1982) (calculating chilling effect of law as magnitude
of punishment multiplied by probability of punishment).
137. See Schauer, supra note 132, at 708 (concluding that harm caused by chilling of free
speech is greater than harm that results from chilling other activities involved).
138. See id. at 705 (concluding that to avoid chilling effect on First Amendment rights,
courts must formulate rules to reduce risk of infringing on right of free exercise); Califa,
supra note 30, at 833 (asserting that legal rules must reflect preference for free speech).
139. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 (3d Cir.)
(approving district court's instruction to jury that abortion protestors have constitutional right
to attempt to persuade abortion clinic to stop performing abortions, to persuade employees
to stop working at clinic, and to persuade patients not to have abortions at clinic), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989); National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp.
1483, 1488, 1497-98 (E.D. Va. 1989) (restricting scope of injunction to prevent interference
with abortion protestor's right to attempt to persuade women not to have abortions).
140. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (refusing
prior restraint of peaceful distribution of literature, which criticized "blockbusting" and "panic
peddling" activities of real estate broker, on public property); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 105-06 (1940) (striking down statute that made it unlawful to picket in public place as
facially violative of First Amendment).
141. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (extending First
Amendment protection to peaceful civil rights boycott which was intended to have coercive
effect); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (stating that peaceful public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because ideas are themselves offensive to some); National
Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1342, 1497 (E.D. Va. 1989) (stating that
abortion protestors' First Amendment right to express views cannot be curtailed or limited
because some persons are timid or reluctant to hear expressions of abortion protestors on
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protestors to form organizations to promote the anti-abortion cause, to
picket and make speeches outside of abortion clinics,1 42 and to engage in
sidewalk counseling. 43
Courts, however, have found that the First Amendment plainly does
not protect some actions, regardless of the expressive political content of
those acts. For example, trespass is not constitutionally protected although
it can be a powerful expressive vehicle.'" Similarly, the First Amendment
does not protect bombing, arson, or other acts of violence. 45 When ad-
dressing the abortion protests, courts have ruled that the blockading of
clinics is unlawful activity that is not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion.'" Likewise, courts have refused to extend First Amendment protection
to the deceptive advertisements of mock abortion clinics' 47 or to speech of
issue of abortion), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v.
Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS 1147.
142. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1262-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (crafting injunction to prevent trespass or blockading activity without intruding
upon abortion protestors' First Amendment rights to picket and express views); aff'd as
modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Northeast
Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1159-60 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (crafting
injunction to prevent trespass or blockading activity without infringing upon right to protest
on public sidewalk near abortion clinic or to attempt to communicate with people entering or
leaving clinic), aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
143. See New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 732 F. Supp 388, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (permitting "sidewalk counseling" if counseling is reasonably quiet and nonthreatening);
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 589-90 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (allowing and defining
"sidewalk" counseling" as reasonably quiet conversation of nonthreatening nature conducted
by not more than two people for each person counseled and stipulating that no one is required
to accept or listen to "sidewalk counseling" and may walk away without harassment), aff'd,
919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990).
144. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) (explaining that right to
exclude others is fundamental element of private property ownership and that First Amendment
does not create right to trespass by distributing bills in interior of privately owned mall);
Armes v. City of Philadelphia, 706 F. Supp. 1156, 1165 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that
anti-abortion protestors do not have right to express views on private grounds of medical
clinics); supra note 10 (listing cases in which injunctions were issued against abortion protestors
to prevent trespass on private property of clinics that provide abortions).
145. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 895 (1982) (concluding that
First Amendment would not protect conduct involving force, violence, or threats); Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (stating that demonstrations which turn violent
lose First Amendment protection).
146. See supra note 5 (listing cases in which courts have prohibited blockading of abortion
clinics).
147. See Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. FM Women's Help & Caring Connection,
444 N.W.2d 683, 683-84 (N.D. 1989) (affirming permanent injunction against mock abortion
clinic to prevent use of deceptive name); Fargo Women's Health Org., Inc. v. Larson, 381
N.W.2d 176, 179 (N.D.) (modifying and affirming preliminary injunction against mock abortion
clinic to prevent use of deceptive name), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); Mother & Unborn
Baby Care of North Texas, Inc. v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533, 536-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(affirming injunction against mock abortion clinic for violating state deceptive trade practices
statute), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989).
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mock abortion clinic employees that rises to the level of intentional infliction
of emotional distress."
To resolve the competing interests of the abortion protestors and their
victims, courts may issue injunctions pursuant to content neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions, such as trespass laws, to prevent abortion
protestors from trespassing on private property 49 and, subsequently, fine
protestors who violate the injunction. 50 Furthermore, a judge may jail or
fine an abortion protestor for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, assault
and battery, or other criminal offenses even though the conduct occurred
during a protest because the state's interest in maintaining order or pro-
tecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens may override the
protestor's First Amendment rights.'5 '
While legislatures have enacted criminal laws for the general protection
of the health, safety, and welfare of society and, thereby, have determined
the extent to which society must generally tolerate a political protestor's
exercise of First Amendment rights, the question remains to what extent an
individual must tolerate a political protestor's exercise of First Amendment
rights.152 Abortion rights advocates and victims of abortion protestors have
used both the Civil Rights Act and civil RICO in an attempt to establish
this balance of rights between individuals. 55
Although later vacated by the Eighth Circuit en banc, 154 the panel
opinion in Lewis v. Pearson55 illustrates that the applicability of the Civil
Rights Act to balance the competing interests of individuals depends upon
the underlying constitutional rights asserted through the statute.156 While
148. See Boes v. Deschu, 768 S.W.2d 205, 207-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that First
Amendment would not protect speech of mock abortion clinic employees that rose to level of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
149. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) (holding that First Amend-
ment does not create right to trespass on interior of privately owned mall for purpose of
distributing handbills); but cf. Brion, The Shopping Mall: Signs of Power, in LAw AND
SEMnmICs 65, 65-108 (Kevelson Vol. 1, 1987) (discussing series of property versus free expression
shopping mall cases and evaluating alternative ways to balance these competing rights inde-
pendent of strict public versus private property distinctions).
150. See supra note 6 (listing cases in which courts have issued injunction to prohibit
abortion protestors from picketing on abortion clinic's property and subsequently fined
protestors for violating injunction).
151. See supra notes 112-51 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment protected
and unprotected conduct and court's use of balancing test to weigh First Amendment rights
against government interest).
152. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (recognizing that government may
prohibit intrusion of unwelcome views into privacy of home, but may not ban same unwelcome
views from public dialogue which may have effect of subjecting unwilling listeners to objec-
tionable speech).
153. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (listing cases in which courts allowed
prosecution of abortion protestors under civil RICO or the Civil Rights Act).
154. Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
155. 908 F.2d 318, vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
156. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 321 (assessing applicability of
civil rights conspiracy statute by evaluating nature of privacy right Lewis asserted), vacated
on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
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the three member panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit (panel) held that the alleged conspiracy to prevent abortion
was actionable under the civil rights conspiracy statute without a showing
of state action, 157 an equally divided Eighth Circuit sitting en banc voted to
dismiss the complaint without discussing the state action issue.15s
The complaint arose when Warna Lewis sued the AAA Problem Preg-
nancy Center (AAA Center), an anti-abortion counseling center or mock
abortion clinic, under 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), 59 alleging that the operators
of the AAA Center conspired to deprive her of the equal protection of the
laws and of her equal privileges and immunities under the laws.'" Lewis
claimed that the operators violated her constitutionally granted rights of
privacy, autonomy, personhood, and liberty in exercising a choice whether
to continue or discontinue a pregnancy.' 6' Lewis claimed that an invidiously
discriminatory animus toward a class of women who had decided to have
an abortion motivated the operators' conspiracy to deny Lewis her consti-
tutional rights. 162 Lewis asserted that her injuries included mental distress,
torment, anguish, morbid recall, sadness, embarrassment, humiliation, and
anger.163 Lewis's lawsuit against the AAA Center sought actual damages of
$150,000 and punitive damages of $10 million.'"
Lewis' complaint alleged that Lewis had decided to have an abortion. 65
Lewis claimed that she looked in the Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages
directory under "Abortion Information and Services" and found an adver-
tisement for the AAA Center in St. Louis, Missouri, which she then
contacted.'" In reply to Lewis's telephone call, a staff member at the AAA
Center allegedly stated that the AAA Center would "help her all [it] could,"
and invited Lewis to come in to take a free pregnancy test. 67
According to Lewis' complaint, when Lewis arrived for her scheduled
appointment a staff member asked Lewis to produce a urine sample for the
pregnancy test and then ushered Lewis into a room where Lewis viewed a
slide presentation.' 6s Lewis alleged that the slide presentation depicted scenes
that illustrated the abortion process and included pictures of dismembered
157. Lewis, 908 F.2d at 325, vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
158. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 917 F.2d 1077, 1077 (8th Cir. 1990)
(summarily affirming district court's dismissal).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) Section 1985(3) defines a civil rights conspiracy as any
act in furtherance of conspiracy to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of the equal privileges and immunities under the law, thereby
injuring such person or property or depriving person of any right or privilege.
160. Lewis, 908 F.2d at 320.
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fetuses and of abortionists using crude-appearing instruments. 69 The slide
show also contained intermittent family scenes. 170 Although the slide pres-
entation distressed Lewis, Lewis still desired to have an abortion.' 7' An
employee of the AAA Center allegedly handed Lewis a note indicating that
she had a hospital appointment to have the abortion two days later.'7 Lewis
claimed that when she arrived for the appointment, she discovered that the
hospital was a Roman Catholic institution whose doctors did not perform
abortions.17 1 She obtained an abortion elsewhere one week later. 74 One
month later an employee of the AAA Center allegedly called Lewis to find
out when the baby was due and to check whether "everything was alright.'
' 75
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
held that Lewis had failed to state a claim under section 1985(3) because
the alleged actions of the operators of the AAA Center did not support the
class based, invidiously discriminatory animus against which Congress in-
tended section 1985(3) to protect. 176 The trial court based this conclusion
on Lewis's own allegation that the operators and employees of the AAA
Center acted out of moral-religious beliefs rather than a discriminatory
animus. 77 The trial court also held that the class of plaintiffs that Lewis
identified lacked a common unifying characteristic to distinguish the class
from the rest of the population. 17s The trial court did not consider whether
section 1985(3) required state action to assert privacy, and liberty claims








176. Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., No. 87-894 C (2), 10 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 1988),
rev'd, 908 F.2d 318, vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990).
177. Id. at 9-10.
178. See id. at 7-10. In Lewis the trial court relied upon Roe v. Abortion Abolition
Society, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), to conclude that the
conspiracy that Lewis alleged was not directed at a class protected by section 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3) (1988). Id. The plaintiffs in Abortion Abolition Society were two anonymous patients,
two doctors who provided abortions, a clinic that provided abortion services, members of the
clinic staff, and an organization that provided escort services to the clinic. Abortion Abolition
Society, 811 F.2d at 932. The Abortion Abolition Society plaintiffs alleged that defendants
had entered into a religiously motivated conspiracy to deny plaintiffs their rights of education,
freedom of choice, privacy, and travel. Id. The Roe court refused § 1985(3) protection to the
class described as "persons who do not share defendants' religious beliefs about abortion,"
and stated that the protected class must be defined by the characteristics of those at whom
the conspiracy is aimed, not by the beliefs of the conspirators. Id. at 935.
179. See id. at 10.
The Supreme Court has construed § 1985(3) to iequire allegation and proof of four
elements: (I) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person
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held that Lewis had failed to state a claim, the trial court did not need to
consider any potential infringement upon the First Amendment rights of
the AAA Center.
On an appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the
Eighth Circuit panel considered whether a private party's alleged conspiracy
to prevent an abortion was actionable under the civil rights conspiracy
statute absent a showing of state action.18 0 The panel also considered whether
the civil rights conspiracy statute protected the class of women seeking an
abortion and, thus, whether an alleged conspiracy by operators of a claimed
mock abortion clinic to prevent an abortion involved class based discrimi-
natory animus.'
Because section 1985(3) on its face omits any requirement of state
action' 2 and provides no substantive rights directly,8 3 the panel focused
upon the underlying constitutional rights that Lewis asserted through the
statute.'84 The panel cited Roe v. Wade"s5 for the proposition that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty through the due process
clause includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of
Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage
and family life as well as the freedom of a woman to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy.8 6 Concluding that no Supreme Court or appellate
court decisions have limited protection of privacy rights to protection against
only official conduct, the panel declined to require state action.'
is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971) (enumerating four
elements required for § 1985(3) claim). In Griffin the Supreme Court reversed an earlier
interpretation of § 1985(3) set out in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), which had
required proof of state action in the conspiracy in order to recover under the statute. Griffin,
403 US. at 102-03. However, the district court in Lewis concluded that section 1985(3) "should
not be read expansively and that the intent of the statute derived from the legislative history
should be considered in determining whether a conspiracy is motivated by class-based animus."
Lewis, No. 87-894 C (2), at 7.
180. Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d at 320-24.
181. See id. at 324-26 (finding sufficient facts alleged to show existence of class-based
discriminatory animus against class of women seeking abortions).
182. See id. at 320-21 (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), for proposition
that § 1985(3) omits requirement of state action).
183. See id. at 321 (citing Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Novotny,
442 U.S. 366 (1979), for proposition that § 1985(3) does not provide direct substantive rights).
184. Lewis, 908 F.2d at 321.
185. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see supra note 104 (discussing Roe v. Wade).
186. Lewis v. Pearson, 908 F.2d 318 at 321-22.
187. Id. at 322. Even though the Eighth Circuit panel in Lewis concluded that no state
action was necessary to apply § 1985(3), the panel alternatively decided that Lewis' complaint,
by alleging that the Missouri Attorney General actively encouraged and participated in the
conspiracy, adequately pleaded state action. Id. at 322-23. Lewis alleged that the Attdrney
General refused to employ the available state statutory and common law remedies to prevent
the AAA Center's deceptive advertising practices. Id. Further, Lewis alleged that the Attorney
General's pronouncement that the AAA Center's advertising did not constitute misrepresen-
tation actively encouraged the AAA Center's conspiracy. Id. Moreover, Lewis alleged that the
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Next, the panel found that women were a protected class for the
purposes of section 1985(3) and that conspiracies directed against women
inherently are invidious and repugnant to the notion of equal fights for all
citizens. 18 In reaching this conclusion, the panel observed that most courts
have not limited the protection of section 1985(3) to racial bias conspiracies
but have extended protection to other classes involving discrimination based
on religion, ideology, or the exercise of a fundamental right. 18 9 On the
Eighth Circuit's rehearing en banc, an equally divided court voted to affirm
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint without discussing the state
action issue. 190
While a lack of uniformity among courts may exist on the issue of
whether section 1985(3) protects the class of women seeking abortions from
abortion protestors' conspiracies to deprive such women constitutional
rights, 191 the majority of courts have concluded that a gender based animus
satisfies the conspiracy requirement of section 1985(3).192 Abortion rights
advocates have successfully prosecuted abortion protestors under section
1985(3) for private interference with the right to interstate travel.' 93 However,
Attorney General took these actions solely because of the highly charged controversy surround-
ing legalized abortion and because the Attorney General either personally concurred with the
AAA Center's activities or desired not to displease the pro-life constituency. Id. at 322.
188. Id. at 325.
189. Id. at 324. The Eighth Circuit panel in Lewis recognized that the Eighth Circuit had
applied § 1985(3) to protect members of a religious group from private interference in Action
v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971), and to protect the right to vote in Indian tribal
elections against interference from private conspiracies in Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). Id.
190. Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacating,
908 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1990).
191. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492-93
(E.D. Va. 1989) (concluding that conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions of rights
guaranteed by law is actionable under § 1985(3)), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS 1147. But see Roe v. Abortion
Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 934-37 (5th Cir.) (holding that patients, doctors, and abortion
clinics and staffs do not form a protected class under §1985(3)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987); National Abortion Fed. v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1170-72 (C.D. Ca.
1989) (same).
192. See Yolk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (extending § 1985(3) to
conspiracies to discriminate against persons based on sex); National Org. for Women v.
Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (concluding that conspiracy to deprive women
seeking abortions of constitutional rights is actionable under § 1985(3)); Roe v. Operation
Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that § 1985(3) covers women seeking
abortions), aff'd, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y.) (same), aff'd as modified, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates
for Life, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or.) (holding that § 1985(3) covers women seeking
abortions), aff'd as modified, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
193. See National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (finding that plaintiffs had
established elements of section 1985(3) claim based on conspiracy to interfere with right to
interstate travel); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (same); Roe v.
Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. at 581-82 (same); New York Nat'l Org. for Women, 704 F.
Supp. at 1259-60 (same).
A BALANCING OF RIGHTS
as the Eighth Circuit's en banc ruling in Lewis illustrates, courts are reluctant
to declare that section 1985(3) protects women seeking abortions from
abortion protestors' private interference with the right to have an abortion.
1'
While abortion rights advocates assert that the putative right to an abortion
is of such a fundamental character that section 1985(3) protects the right
to an abortion as against all interference, not just governmental interfer-
ence, 95 one court called such a claim problematic. 96 That court cited
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services'9 for the proposition that the law
concerning a putative abortion right is in a state of flux and concluded that
to venture into this "thicket" would be imprudent. 9 Resolving the question
of whether section 1985(3) protects women from abortion protestors' private
interference with the right to have an abortion may too closely resemble
the ongoing legal and popular debate regarding the extent to which the
Constitution protects the right to have an abortion, an issue the Supreme
Court has yet to resolve.'9
While the Civil Rights Act may or may not apply to conflicts of
constitutional rights between individuals,m courts still must resolve the
conflict of rights between individuals when a constitutional right of the
victim is not at stake. To balance the First Amendment rights of the political
protestor and the rights of their victims in civil cases, courts not only must
articulate applicable constitutional principles but also must review the evi-
dence to ensure that the court properly applies those principles. 20 Because
the First Amendment protects freedom of expression from both direct attack
as well as from more subtle interference,2m the First Amendment imposes
194. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 917 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1990) (dismissing
§ 1985(3) claim and refusing to adopt position of majority of courts that § 1985(3) protects
women seeking abortions); National Org. for Women 726 F. Supp. at 1492-94 (allowing §
1985(3) claim for interference with right to interstate travel but not as to interference with
right to abortion).
195. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (E.D.
Va. 1989) (evaluating abortion rights advocates' claim that § 1985(3) protects right to abortion
from private as well as governmental interference), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Clinic, 1991 US LEXIS.
196. See id. (calling claim that § 1985(3) protects right to abortion from private interference
problematic).
197. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); see supra note 105 (discussing Webster decision).
198. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1494.
199. See id. (implicitly suggesting that because Webster raised doubts as to status of
constitutional right to abortion, evaluating civil rights conspiracy claim based on private
interference with right to abortion would be imprudent); supra note 105 (discussing status of
abortion right after Webster).
200. See Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 320-21 (stating that Civil
Rights Act does not require state action on its face), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 1077
(8th Cir. 1990).
201. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-16 n.50 (1981) (finding
that First Amendment requires court to scrutinize evidence to insure that court properly applies
First Amendment principles).
202. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963)
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a special obligation on courts to examine critically the basis on which a
plaintiff seeks to impose liability. 20 First, a court must distinguish First
Amendment protected conduct from unprotected conduct to insure that the
plaintiff seeks to impose liability only for conduct that the First Amendment
does not protect and insist on use of the most precisely tailored causes of
action.2 4 The court's role in protecting First Amendment rights focuses the
court's attention on the political protestor's means and not the political
protestor's endm5 and thereby protects robust debate2°6 from government
interference and from the chilling effect of imposing civil liability unlimited
by First Amendment considerations.
20 7
Asserting that only nonpeaceful activity, which falls outside the para-
meters of protected conduct, may form the basis of a RICO claim for
extortion, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle,m° on a
motion for a directed verdict, distinguished the First Amendment protected
conduct from the unprotected conduct and insured that plaintiffs presented
enough evidence to allow a jury to impose liability under the RICO cause
of action only upon unprotected conduct.209 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that, at the end of the
trial, the district court also adequately instructed the jury with respect to
the scope of the protections of the First Amendment.21 0 In McMonagle the
(finding contempt conviction for refusal to divulge contents of membership records to legislature
to be subtle interference with First Amendment rights); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960) (reversing conviction of NAACP members who refused to furnish city official with
membership lists because convictions constituted subtle attack on First Amendment rights).
203. See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 915 (stating that First Amendment requires
courts to examine basis on which plaintiff seeks to impose liability).
204. See id. at 915-16 (1981) (holding that First Amendment protected conduct of members
of NAACP and prevented imposition of civil liability); Mayton, supra note 136, at 266
(discussing court's role in adequately protecting First Amendment rights).
205. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between means
and end of civil disobedient).
206. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that First
Amendment provides for uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on public issues).
207. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of chilling effect
on First Amendment rights).
208. 670 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
209. Id. at 1306-10.
210. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
Several district court rulings in the McMonagle case preceded the Third Circuit's ultimate
affirmation of the application of civil RICO to the abortion protestors. On a motion to
dismiss, the district court in McMonagle found that the Center had sufficiently pled facts for
the civil RICO claim to withstand the motion to dismiss. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp. 736, 738
(E.D. Pa. 1985). After the Center had presented its case at trial, the district court considered
the abortion protestors' motion for a directed verdict on the civil RICO claim. McMonagle,
670 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-10 (E.D. Pa. 1987). The district court concluded that the Center had
alleged sufficient evidence of abortion protestors' conduct that the First Amendment would
not protect to support the elements of civil RICO claim. Id. at 1310. Following the jury
verdict finding the abortion protestors liable under civil RICO, the district court ordered an
A BALANCING OF RIGHTS
Northeast Women's Center (the Center), which provides gynecological serv-
ices including pregnancy testing and abortions, sued abortion protestors for
causing property and business damage to the Center through a pattern of
robbery and extortion, crimes which RICO211 includes in its definition of
racketeering activities. 212
According-to the Center's complaint, the abortion protestors created an
atmosphere of fear among the patients and employees to induce the Center
to part with its intangible property interest in continuing to provide abor-
tions.213 Further, the Center claimed that through an atmosphere of fear,
the abortion protestors induced employees to part with their property interest
in continued employment at the Center and induced the patients to part
with their property interest in entering into a contractual relationship with
the Center.2 4 Ultimately, the Third Circuit in McMonagle considered whether
the abortion protestors could be liable under RICO for their intinidation
and harassment of the Center, which resulted in destruction of the Center's
property, and if so, whether the court should issue an injunction and award
triple damages and attorneys fees pursuant to civil RICO.
215
The defendants in McMonagle vigorously opposed abortion by repeat-
edly engaging in activities at the Center to protest the Center's abortion
services. 2 6 The Third Circuit found that the Center presented evidence which
showed that the abortion protestors unlawfully entered the Center on four
occasions. 217 On two of those occasions, the protestors stormed the Center,
knocked down Center employees who tried to prevent protestors' entry,
blocked access to the clinic rooms, and damaged some of the Center's
medical equipment.218 On the other two occasions, the protestors conducted
injunction against trespass and assessed damages. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1163 (E.D.
Pa. 1987). On appeal the Third Circuit upheld the application of civil RICO despite the
abortion protestors' First Amendment arguments, finding that the district court had given
careful and accurate instructions to the jury. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (3d Cir.
1989). The Third Circuit also rejected the availability of the justification defense for the
abortion protestors. Id. at 1348-57. Further, the Third Circuit did allow expanded injunctive
relief pursuant to the successful RICO claim. Id. at 1353-56.
211. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
212. McMonagle, 624 F. Supp. at 738. The district court in McMonagle stated that a
defendant may be held liable under RICO for engaging through an enterprise in a "pattern
of racketeering activity," as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). Id. The court further
explained that racketeering activity, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988), includes robbery
and extortion. Id.
213. Id. at 738-41.
214. Id.
215. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50. 1353-
57 (3d Cir.) (discussing application of RICO, scope of injunction issued, and availability of
punitive damages), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989), later proceeding, 889 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.
1989) (allowing attorney's fees pursuant to successful civil RICO claim).
216. See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345 (reviewing facts and procedural history of McMonagle
case).
217. Id. at 1345-46.
218. Id.
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sit-down protests in the Center's waiting room, castigated patients, and
ignored repeated requests to leave the building. 2 9 During one of these
demonstrations, one protestor stated, "We're going to shut this place
down."220 Other protestors reportedly blocked the doors to the Center. 1
The Third Circuit found that the Center also presented testimony which
revealed that on these and other occasions the protestors were observed
taking photographs of patients, chanting through bullhorns, blocking build-
ing entrances, and pounding on the windows of employees' cars.m Videotape
evidence revealed demonstrators pushing, shoving, and tugging on patients
as the patients attempted to approach the Center, knocking over and crossing
police barricades, and preventing cars from entering the Center's parking
lot.2m A protestor is recorded stating, "I bet you ten to one this place
doesn't last six months."2 Another added, "This place is going to be shut
down.'"'2 One of the Center's doctors testified that the patients and
employees within the Center could hear the sound of chanting, amplified
by bullhorns, even within the Center's operating room. 226 Another doctor
testified that this noise put patients "under considerably greater stress,"
especially when going into or coming out of general anesthesia. 227
Ultimately, the jury found the abortion protestors liable under RICO
and awarded compensatory damages, which the district court tripled pur-
suant to provisions of civil RICO.m On appeal to the Third Circuit, the
abortion protestors challenged the application of civil RICO arguing that
because the protestors had acted in response to their political beliefs, civil
RICO should be inapplicable.? 9 The Center argued, as it did throughout
the trial, that it was not challenging the abortion protestors' right to make
public the protestor's opposition to abortion, but that the activities of the
abortion protestors went beyond the constitutional right of free speech. 210
The Third Circuit upheld the RICO conviction, stating that "[d]efendants'
description of their conduct as 'civil disobedience' does not thereby im-
munize [the defendants' conduct] from statutes proscribing the very acts
the jury found [d]efendants committed."' 23
The Third Circuit admitted that it would have grave concerns were










228. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (E.D. Pa.
1987), aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
229. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
230. Id. at 1345.
231. Id. at 1348.
A BALANCING OF RIGHTS
the expression of dissenting political opinions in a manner protected under
the First Amendment. 232 However, the Third Circuit found that the district
court carefully instructed the jury with respect to the scope of the protections
of the First Amendment. 231 The district court instructed the jury that the
First Amendment guaranteed the defendants the right to express their views,
to attempt to persuade the Center to stop performing abortions, and to
persuade the Center's employees to stop working there.234 The Third Circuit
further noted that the district court instructed the jury that the First
Amendment protected the defendants right to persuade the Center's patients
not to have abortions at the Center, even if the protests may have been
coercive or offensive. 235 However, the district court stated that the First
Amendment did not offer a sanctuary for violators. 236 The Third Circuit
reasoned that the jury's award of damages under RICO established that the
jury found that the defendant abortion protestors' actions went beyond
mere dissent and publication of their political views. 237 Finding no First
Amendment problems, the court concluded that RICO was applicable to
the actions of the abortion protestors. 23s The court asserted that a court is
not free to read additional limits into RICO once a plaintiff has established
the elements required for a finding of liability under the statute's explicit
provisions.239
Although a court may not be free to read additional limits into RICO,
the McMonagle district court insured that the jury could base a finding of
liability under RICO only upon elements of unprotected conductm then
allowed the jury to perform the ultimate balancing of rights.?A The district
court concluded that a jury could find that the abortion protestors, through
unauthorized entries into the Center, placed Center employees and patients
in fear, thereby extorting the intangible property interests of the Center,
the Center's employees, and the Center's patients?22 Furthermore, the district
court found that the Center presented evidence which allowed the jury to
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1348-49.




238. Id. at 1348.
239. Id.
240. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. 1300, 1306-10
(comparing evidence to RICO elements to insure that only unprotected conduct formed basis
of RICO claim), later proceeding, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (ordering injunction
of trespass and assessing damages pursuant to jury's finding of liability under civil RICO),
aff'd as modified, 868 F.2d 1342; 1348-57 (3d Cir.) (upholding application of civil RICO
despite abortion protestors' First Amendment arguments, rejecting availability of justification
defense for abortion protestors, and findingthat court may expand injunctive relief pursuant
to successful RICO claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 261 (1989).
241. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 670 F. Supp. at 1306-10 (insuring
RICO claim relied upon only unprotected conduct and allowing claim to go to jury).
242. Id. at 1306-10.
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conclude that the abortion protestors, through the use of physical force,
removed property from the Center's offices, thereby committing robbery.23
Because the jury found the protestors liable under civil RICO, the Third
Circuit allowed the civil RICO remedies of triple damages and attorneys
fees. 24 Additionally, the Third Circuit determined that, pursuant to the
successful civil RICO claim, defendant abortion protestors could be per-
manently enjoined from entering the Center's premises, blocking its en-
trances, or inciting any of these activities. 24
Despite the Third Circuit's claim that the McMonagle trial judge was
the "epitome" of a careful and restrained jurist who evaluated with im-
partiality the abortion protestors' claims and First Amendment rights,2 s
critics of the application of RICO to abortion protestors contest that the
use of RICO chills First Amendment rights.27 The mere threat of treble
damages and of being labeled a racketeer can intimidate defendants into
settlement in nonmeritorious suits u8 The use of RICO against advocacy
organizations has a chilling effect on those organizations because individuals
may refuse to join the organizations out of fear of being sued under RICO,
at the same time chilling the First Amendment rights of present members.2 9
Moreover, civil RICO imposes severe penalties that outweigh the nature of
the offenses. 210 The opponents of the use of civil RICO against political
protestors claim that civil RICO's penal provisions go beyond punishing the
particular unlawful means and effectively chill legitimate political protests.25'
However, supporters of the use of civil RICO against abortion protestors
243. Id. at 1308. -
244. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonage, 889 F.2d 466, 477 (3d Cir.
1989) (affirming award of attorneys fees and costs).
245. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1353-56 (3d
Cir.) (permitting expanded injunction pursuant to civil RICO claim), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
261 (1989).
246. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 477 (3d Cir. 1989).
247. See Califa, supra note 30, at 833-36 (arguing that using RICO in ideological disputes
chills First Amendment rights); Melley, supra note 30, a.t 312 (arguing that Congress must
reform RICO to prevent misapplication and infringement upon First Amendment rights); Note,
Political Realm, supra note 30, at 225 (claiming that application of RICO in political realm
chills First Amendment rights).
248. Caiifa, supra note 30, at 834; see also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text
(discussing how magnitude of harm may chill First Amendment rights).
249. Caiifa, supra note 30, at 834; see also Caba, 3d Circuit RICO Ruling Cheers Pro-
Choicers, NAT'L L.J., March 20, 1989, at 28 (quoting attorney for Center in McMonagle who
claimed that RICO provides first effective way to deal with ongoing, day-in and day-out
harassment of clients and staff at Center and that Center chose to "raise the stakes" through
use of RICO because RICO allows award of legal expenses, restitution, and punitive damages).
250. See Note, Stretching of Civil RICO, supra note 30, at 312 (arguing that RICO has
become tool by which to federalize common law actions and thereby impose very harsh
penalties); Abortion; Rescue Bails Out, TnmE, Feb. 12, 1990, at 29 (reporting on Randall
Terry's release from Georgia prison and subsequent dissolution of Operation Rescue allegedly
due to $50,000 lawsuit filed by National Organization for Women).
251. See Note, Political Realm, supra note 30, at 224-25 (arguing that application of
RICO against political protestors chills First Amendment rights).
A BALANCING OF RIGHTS
assert that civil RICO provides restitution to victims of organized crime and
buttresses traditional law enforcement methods that have not been sufficient
to halt organized criminality. 2 Two commentators claims that the use of
RICO against abortion protestors reflects a civil rights application of RICO
that is appropriate when the protestors are private persons.2 3
CONCLUSION
According to one commentator, civil disobedience is a form of com-
munication within the theory of the First Amendment, although the extent
to which the First Amendment shields the disobedient's means may depend
upon whether the disobedient violated a law where a third person is injured
or one where merely the state must tolerate the exercise of First Amendment
rights.2 4 Through criminal laws, legislatures balance the First Amendment
rights of civilly disobedient protestors and the rights of their victims2 5 while
courts have often required the state to adjust itself to the citizen's conscience
and First Amendment rights .56 The criminal laws, along with traditional
First Amendment doctrine define the extent to which society must tolerate
the civilly disobedient abortion protestor's exercise of First Amendment
rights.23 The extent to which an individual must tolerate an abortion
protestor's exercise of First Amendment rights remains to be determined on
a case by case basis. As Lewis v. Pearson illustrates, the Civil Rights Act
helps to strike that balance between individuals by focusing upon the
underlying constitutional right asserted by the victim. 2 In other civil con-
texts, the nexus between civil disobedience and First Amendment rights
provides the guidance for courts to balance the civilly disobedient abortion
protestors' claims with the rights of individual victims. By insuring that the
cause of action seeks to impose liability only upon conduct that the First
Amendment does not protect, courts may balance the First Amendment
252. See Note, Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle: A Message to Political
Activists, 23 AKRON L. REv. 251, 267 (1989) (arguing that civil RICO provides restitution to
victims of organized crirme where traditional law enforcement methods have not been sufficient);
Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 8, at 267-68, 276-77 (claiming that state law remedies against
abortion protestors are weak or ineffective and that RICO provides effective way to stop
multiple criminal acts of abortion protestors).
253. Henn & Del Monaco, supra note 8, at 276-77.
254. Freeman, supra note 92, at 232, 245.
255. See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (discussing balance of government
interest in protecting health, safety, and welfare against First Amendment rights).
256. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943 (emphasizing that sole conflict
is between authority and rights of individual); supra notes 112-31 (discussing way courts will
balance First Amendment rights against state interests); Freeman, supra note 92, at 245 (noting
.courts' distinction of situation where third person is injured and where state is incommoded).
257. See supra notes 139-51 (discussing extent to which society must tolerate abortion
protestors' exercise of First Amendment rights).
258. See supra notes 154-90 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Civil Rights
Act in Lewis).
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rights of one individual with the rights a plaintiff may assert.219 While some
criticize the use of civil RICOm against abortion protestors, claiming that
potential RICO liability chills First Amendment rights, the McMonagle court
insured that only unprotected conduct established a prima facie RICO claim
and allowed the jury to perform the ultimate balancing of rights.63 The
McMonagle courts' method of analysis, despite agreement or disagreement
with the jury's eventual verdict, demonstrates how a court may adequately
balance the conflicting First Amendment rights of civilly disobedient abor-
tion protestors with the rights of their individual victims.
KELLY L. FAGLIONi
259. See supra notes 208-45 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment analysis
and application of civil RICO to abortion protestors in McMonagle).
260. See supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of application of
civil RICO in political realm).
261. See supra notes 232-43 (discussing McMonagle court's evaluation of First Amendment
rights).
